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In the second half of 2008, the trial of Thomas Dyilo Lubanga was originally expected to commence at the International Criminal Court (ICC),1 five years after the 
Court commenced operations. The ICC’s 2007 budget was $146 
million (93 million euros), leaving it still some way behind 
the $1.2 billion (762 million euros) and $1 billion (635 mil-
lion euros) spent by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) respectively in their ten years of operation, 
a cost of between $10–15 million (6.4–9.5 million euros) per 
accused. 
At the same time, two hybrid tribunals are moving forward. 
In late 2008, the trial of Kaing Guek Eav is due to commence at 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), 
more than two years after the Court commenced operations. In 
March 2008 the ECCC presented a budget to donors request-
ing an additional $115 million (73 million euors) on top of the 
$56 million (35.5 million euors) originally budgeted for three 
years. With only five accused, a budget of $180 million (114 
million euros) would allocate $36 million (23 million euros) 
per accused. Meanwhile, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) in Sarajevo is running a large number of internationalized 
trials at $709,000 (450,000 euros) per trial, which is predicted to 
reduce to $236,000 (150,000 euros) over the next two years.
It is not clear why there are such vast differences in the cost 
of different tribunals, all of which officially meet international 
standards of fairness. Excessive costs and delays limit the ability 
of courts to try a broad range of people, leading to an element 
of arbitrariness where an individual will only be tried if it is 
probable that the budget of the court permits it. The delays also 
create a conflict between the positive obligation of the State 
to investigate violations of the right to life and the right of the 
accused to trial in a reasonable time. 
The CosT of JusTiCe
War crimes trials are expensive. In a well-developed national 
criminal justice system, a murder trial often takes hundreds 
of police hours to investigate, leading to a trial that may take 
months. Terrorist cases, organized crime, and white-collar crime 
cases are more complex and may cost millions of dollars. 
Crimes against humanity are by definition widespread or sys-
tematic, so the investigative authorities must find evidence for 
thousands of individual incidents, often with far less resources 
than would be dedicated to a simple murder in a rich country, 
often trying to undertake investigations in remote areas, years 
after the events, and probably in a foreign language. 
This is not a new problem. Over 15,000 war crimes trials 
took place in Europe and Asia following the Second World 
War. The scale and speed of those investigations is remarkable, 
producing thousands of statements and tons of evidence within 
a few months, followed by trials that took a week or so. The 
relatively high acquittal rates indicate that the tribunals focused 
strongly on the legal and factual issues before them. 
The trials undertaken by the military authorities of the 
United Kingdom (UK) in Asia took place in Singapore, Kuala 
Lumpur, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Burma, and North Borneo. The 
legal basis and political structures for the war crimes trials were 
negotiated in October 1944, with the Regulations for the Trial 
of War Criminals of June 1945, outlining the legal basis for the 
trials within the military justice system.2
The targets set were daunting to say the least. In October 
1945, UK Attorney General Hartley Shawcross stated that 500 
trials should be concluded by July 1946, i.e. within nine months. 
By December a total of 17 investigative teams were created, 
mainly utilizing agents of the Special Operations Executive. 
They collected 35,963 statements from ex-prisoners of war, 
together with civilian statements, placing advertisements in 
newspapers to appeal for information. 
Trials started in Singapore in January 1946, and by May 
8,900 suspects were in custody. However, delays started, and a 
lack of translators and Japanese defense counsel made it impos-
sible to meet the targets. The estimates were revised, and the 
completion deadline was extended by 12 months to July 1947. 
A total of 919 individuals were tried for war crimes before the 
UK authorities.
fifTy years on: The speCial panels for serious 
Crimes in easT Timor
The United Nations (UN) Security Council created the 
Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor — with the 
creation of the UN Transitional Authority for East Timor 
(UNTAET) — by Resolution 1272 of October 1999. UNTAET 
gave the Dili District Court exclusive jurisdiction for trials 
involving genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 
By June 2000 50 individuals were in custody. In contrast to 
the annual budgets of about $100 million (63.5 million euros) 
then allocated to the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Panels 2001 
budget was $6.3 million (4 million euros), $6 million (3.8 mil-
lion euros) of which was allocated to the prosecution, with 
only $300,000 (190,000 euros) for the rest of the court.3 The 
2003–2005 budget was $14,358,600 (9,116,340 euros), even 
less when divided annually.4  
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Substantial organizational issues arose regarding staffing, 
translation, court management and the provision of defense law-
yers. One highly informed commentator concluded:
“…the performance of the UN in East Timor represents a 
virtual text-book case of how not to create, manage, and 
administer a ‘hybrid’ tribunal. Handicapped from the begin-
ning by a debilitating lack of resources, an unclear man-
date, inadequate recruitment, ineffective management by a 
peacekeeping mission that had other priorities, and above all 
a lack of political will both at UN headquarters and at the 
mission level, the Special Panels struggled to meet the many 
challenges they faced.” 5 
During the tribunal’s creation, problems arose due to hiring 
personnel with little experience in court management, and not 
hiring a chief administrative officer. Simultaneous translation 
equipment arrived late in the process, and even then the inter-
preters were not trained to a standard sufficient to use them. The 
lack of transcriptions of court proceedings led to problems for 
appeals. Case and file management systems did not arrive until 
the very end of the process. Witnesses and accused were often 
transported in the same buses to get to court. Critically, initial 
attempts to use local defense lawyers against international pros-
ecutors failed, leading to concerns as to the fairness of some 
convictions.6 Many concluded that the process was ‘deeply 
flawed’ and that trying to achieve justice on the cheap “does an 
injustice to those individuals convicted without a fair trial and 
undermines the very standards of the justice and the rule of law 
that the tribunals are supposed to advance.”7
The exTraordinary Chambers
At the same time, negotiations continued for the creation 
of another hybrid tribunal. In June 1997, the then Co-Prime 
Ministers of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun 
Sen, wrote to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requesting UN 
assistance to create a court to try the Khmer Rouge. Seven years 
of tortuous negotiations followed, with the UN withdrawing 
from the process but then being forced back to the negotiation 
table by the UN General Assembly.8  
The Group of Experts Report issued by the UN in 1999 iden-
tified a number of concerns regarding trial operations. In partic-
ular, it warned of the weakness of the Cambodian legal system, 
concluding that “domestic trials organized under Cambodian 
law are not feasible and should not be supported financially by 
the United Nations.” 9 The experts commented that any tribunal 
for the Khmer Rouge would “involve a significant commitment 
of resources” 10 and warned that:
“any UN tribunal . . . will be established somewhat slowly 
and then only trudge through its caseload. The Group thus 
recommends that the UN, building upon its experience 
with the prior tribunals, undertake all necessary measures 
to expedite the establishment of the court. These should 
certainly include exemptions from competitive bidding 
and, most important, from limitations on secondment to 
take effect immediately upon the court’s legal establish-
ment. The budgetary approval process also needs to be 
streamlined.” 11 
The original budget for the ECCC was $56 million (35.5 
million euros), with $13 million (8.25 million euros) provided 
by the Government of Cambodia and $43 million (27.3 million 
euros) provided by the international community through volun-
tary donations. The entire process was supposed to take three 
years, commencing in June 2006 and finishing in June 2009. 
Whilst the donor community made pledges covering the UN 
portion, the Cambodian government was not able to produce the 
money it pledged and sought donor assistance, which still left a 
shortfall of over $4 million (c= 2.5 million).12 
During 2007 it became clear that the ECCC had no hope of 
completing the trials within the original timescale and budget. 
In March 2008 a new request for funding was presented to 
donors, extending the lifespan of the Court until March 2011 and 
requesting an additional $115 million (73 million euros), taking 
the total budget to almost $170 million (108 million euros). 
With only five accused, this created a cost per trial of $36 mil-
lion (23 million euros).
The War Crimes Chamber of The CourT of  
bosnia and herzegovina
Whilst the negotiations for Cambodia continued, another 
hybrid court came into being in Sarajevo. UN Security Council 
in Resolution 1503 of August 2003 called for the completion 
strategies of the ICTY and ICTR to be facilitated by the trans-
fer of lower level cases to be tried in domestic courts. This 
became known as the “Rule 11bis” process. Consultations were 
undertaken in 2003 between the ICTY and the Office of the 
High Representive13 in BiH on the best way to ensure fair trials, 
and new national criminal and criminal procedure codes were 
subsequently enacted that reflected European legal standards. 
A new state court was created, and within that the War Crimes 
Chamber came into being to try genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, together with a law regulating the use 




















Krešo Luč  ić, accused of crimes against humanity of torture, imprison-
ment and other inhumane acts, stands trial at the War Crimes Chamber 
in Bosnia.
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The Court of BiH is a permanent institution within the domestic 
legal order, subject to Bosnia’s international obligations, includ-
ing an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
making it the first war crimes court subject to the ECHR’s 
jurisdiction. 
For an initial transitional period there are international legal, 
judicial, and administrative staff. Within five years, however, 
the international staff will leave and hand the process over to 
their domestic counterparts. In September 2006 a Transition 
Council was created consisting of representatives from the gov-
ernment and the international community to ensure an effective 
transition. 
The Court of BiH had to work quickly. The Registry was 
established in early 2005, and on September 1, 2005 the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber approved the first ‘11bis’ transfer in the case 
of Radovan Stanković. In the intervening period, a vast amount 
of administrative work was undertaken to prepare for the first 
trials. This included recruitment of administrative and legal 
staff, prosecutors, and judges. Architects organized the renova-
tion of a government building to provide office space and eight 
court rooms, one of which is suitable for high security cases. A 
new detention facility was built to house those under pre-trial 
detention.15
The Court of BiH and the Prosecutor’s Office is partially 
funded by the Ministry of Justice’s regular budget, and partially 
by voluntary contributions from individual donor countries. The 
government provided $4.7 million (3 million euros) in 2005 and 
plans to provide approximately $15.8 million (10 million euros) 
annually by 2010. A separate donor-funded budget funds the 
international staff, which amounted to $15.8 million (10 mil-
lion euros) in 2006, reducing to $7.9 million (5 million euros) 
in 2009. National staff will increase from 125 in 2006 to 380 
in 2010, whilst over the same period international staff will 
decrease from 65 to 14. The real difference from all other tribu-
nals is that with eight courtrooms and 53 judges, the Court of 
BiH is able to process several hundred cases per year. This cre-
ates a pre-trial cost of approximately $708,000 (450,000 euros) 
in 2006 reducing to $236,000 (150,000 euros) in 2010.16
building a CourT
Hybrid tribunals are complex to create. Even where the 
proposed court is constructed within the existing legal system 
it normally requires a new legal structure, new buildings, a new 
budget and new staff. Once the tribunal is created, the trials 
will almost certainly be the most complicated trials that have 
ever occurred in that country, using techniques and concepts 
unknown to domestic judges, prosecutors, and lawyers.
The long period of preparatory work requires assessing 
whether there is political will for war crimes trials and per-
suading those who may be suspicious of such trials. If new 
legislation is required, it must be passed through the national 
assembly in a form that is acceptable to the international com-
munity. Diplomats who will later be invited to pay for the court 
must be kept involved. Widespread consultations must take 
place throughout different parts of the community to ensure full 
involvement of all key players. Large-scale reforms in other key 
areas may be necessary. For example, BiH instituted a large-
scale re-appointment process for the judiciary that improved 
confidence in their independence and impartiality. In Cambodia 
this never happened, leading to concerns that judges are still 
influenced by the government.17
Managing a new court requires unique individuals who 
understand the final “product” that is being created, and who 
have experience with criminal justice. Many trial lawyers and 
judges with years of courtroom experience never acquired the 
management skills required for such a multi-million dollar proj-
ect, whereas some excellent administrators may not have neces-
sary legal skills for negotiating with foreign judiciaries. 
It may be necessary to build and equip new courtrooms. 
Internationally acceptable detention facilities may not exist, so 
one will have to be built. In BiH a fully-equipped building with 
six courtrooms equipped for simultaneous interpretation was 
built in less than a year. In Phnom Penh the ECCC has failed to 
convert the one room it has into a courtroom after more than two 
years in possession of the buildings, and interpretation equip-
ment still has to be rented.
“Many experienced 
individuals now work  
at the ICTY and ICTR, but 
there is a risk that those 
who have only experienced 
the luxuries of a billion 
dollar budget may not 
understand how the job  
can be done for a fraction 
of the price.”
sTaffing The CourT
Staff must be recruited, not only for legal positions but also 
for a broad range of administrative tasks. Systems for security, 
computers, interpretation and broadcasts of the proceedings must 
all be budgeted, purchased and managed. Court management 
systems must be created that can deal with large paper-based 
trials with hundreds of thousands of pages of evidence. These 
key positions require previous experience working in a criminal 
court system. Whilst UN staffers have a broad range of experi-
ence in peacekeeping missions, East Timor has demonstrated 
that those skills cannot easily transfer to running a war crimes 
court. Many experienced individuals now work at the ICTY and 
ICTR, but there is a risk that those who have only experienced 
the luxuries of a billion dollar budget may not understand how 
the job can be done for a fraction of the price.
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Staff recruitment raises a crucial question as to the extent to 
which it is possible to build the capacity of under-skilled staff 
whilst at the same time ensuring that the trials meet international 
standards and are completed within a reasonable time. Many 
observers concluded the East Timor trials were unfair. BiH 
trials are required to meet the more exacting standards of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, and a challenge can be 
made to that Strasbourg-based court if they do not. 
As a secondary benefit, hybrid tribunals can raise the quality 
of justice in a country, and leave a lasting legacy. In a court such 
as the ECCC it is not clear how such laudable processes can be 
effective given the limited timescale and the small number of 
trials that will take place. The Cambodian judges, prosecutors, 
and defense lawyers will learn new skills that they can take with 
them back to their ordinary practice, but there will be little direct 
effect on the other courts in Cambodia. In BiH, the permanent 
nature of the Court and the detailed transition may make the 
skills-transfer more deeply embedded, making Court of BiH a 
genuine example to other national courts.
One of the most controversial aspects of setting up a tribunal 
is deciding on the different pay rates that will apply to “interna-
tional” staff and those recruited locally. Some argue that all staff 
should be paid the same amount for doing the same job, as at the 
ICTY and the ICTR where all staff is “international.” However, 
one of the advantages of a hybrid tribunal is the lower staff 
cost, allowing the court to get more for its dollars. UN missions 
set salary levels for local staff, as opposed to those who were 
selected from a global competition for the position. In BiH, local 
salary levels were close to government salaries, with local staff 
being paid approximately 20 to 30 percent of a full international 
salary. In Cambodia, local salaries have been set at 50 percent of 
the gross UN salary, meaning that local judges, prosecutors and 
lawyers are paid approximately three to four times the salary of 
their counterparts in BiH. Hence the ECCC has lost many of the 
financial advantages of being based in a developing country.
There is also a phenomenon of “Rolls Royce” staffing levels. 
In a domestic trial involving multiple defendants, the prosecu-
tion is normally represented in court by one or two advocates 
and supported by a small team of lawyers who help prepare the 
case. The defense may have two advocates, which often means 
the prosecution will be outnumbered in the courtroom. This is 
perfectly normal and fair. By contrast, in international criminal 
trials, multiple advocates often appear for the prosecution dur-
ing the course of the trial, with only one or two advocates for 
each defendant. Whilst such staffing levels may make the pros-
ecutors’ job easier, it is a luxury that is not affordable in most 
domestic jurisdictions and certainly not for hybrid tribunals on 
a tight budget.
budgeTary amnesTy
Where there have been violations of the right to life, human 
rights law guarantees a proper investigation into the killings. 
There are also significant soft law standards that support and 
enhance this “right to the truth.” Human rights law, however, 
specifically guarantees the right of the accused to be tried within 
a reasonable time, and where the trials deal with widespread 
allegations of criminal violations, it is often impossible to 
reconcile the two conflicting positions. There is also a danger 
that judges and prosecutors, keen to write history, bite off more 
than they can chew, leading to unwieldy trials with excessive 
charges that the accused may not survive. In domestic jurisdic-
tions, prosecutors are accustomed to utilizing “sample counts” 
to prove a course of conduct without necessarily having to prove 
each act of the accused.
Prosecutors or investigating judges do not like to accept 
constraints on their discretion. As state agents, however, they 
have a duty to organise themselves in such a way as to ensure 
the human rights of the accused are protected. The ECHR 
has frequently stated that the state is obligated to organise its 
criminal justice system to ensure the rights of the accused, and 
that it must show “special diligence” in its attempts to move 
the process forward. The Court has explicitly stated that delays 
occasioned by a shortage of equipment or personnel might be 
taken into consideration as displaying a lack of due diligence.18 
Similarly, the Court has held that legal systems of member states 
should be able to cope with such requirements.19
Detaining someone if there was little possibility of a trial 
due to lack of funding would be an arbitrary and unlawful act. If 
the budget only permits nine trials, is it acceptable under human 
rights standards to arrest a tenth on the basis that money will be 
found at some time in the future? Whilst with national budgets 
the government may divert funds from another area, the same 
does not apply to tribunals funded by voluntary contributions 
from the international community. If the money is not in the 
bank account in New York, no one can spend it. 
Where the court will only have a limited mandate it essen-
tially means that there is de facto impunity by way of budgetary 
amnesty for all other offenders. In BiH there are approximately 
13,000 police files for offenses during the war. The Court of 
BiH will be able to try perhaps 5,000 people in the next ten to 
15 years, with the rest being sent to lower courts. In Cambodia, 
perhaps only five people will face trial. All other perpetrators 


























Former Democratic Kampuchea foreign minister Ieng Sary stands for 
the first time in the Pre-trial Chamber.
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EndnotEs: funding JusTiCe
ConClusion
courts must act within their financial limits. Domestic courts 
are permanent institutions, allowing some flexibility in case 
management and timing of trials. Hybrid tribunals may be work-
ing towards a date when they have to shut down, making the 
financial controls more blunt. 
Complex criminal trials require highly experienced staff, 
whether they be administrators, court managers, prosecutors, or 
defense lawyers. National criminal systems have constant pres-
sures to cut costs, and discretion is exercised to ensure that the 
appropriate cases are taken to court and tried within a reasonable 
time. The huge budgets of the ICTY and ICTR have produced 
unsustainable and un-repeatable models, and hybrid tribunals 
may wish to look to national models to obtain the most efficient 
staff. 
Whilst the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights is the UN authority for transitional justice, the Office of 
Legal Affairs in New York takes precedence regarding tribu-
nals. When a court is created within the domestic legal order of 
a country, it is not entirely clear who would be responsible.
The two latest hybrid courts are very different. The ECCC 
in Cambodia is a joint project between the UN and Cambodia, 
 utilizing an investigative judge system with a very fixed life 
span, at a cost of approximately $35 million (22.2 million euros) 
per year to run one trial court. The Court of BiH has been created 
without UN involvement, as a permanent institution designed to 
try many hundreds if not thousands of people, at a cost of $16 
million (10 million euros) per year to run eight trial courts.
The two courts should be closely watched to establish 
which model should be repeated in the future if international 
justice requires domestic trials to complement the trials at the 
International Criminal Court. HRB
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